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Part I
Introduction
In order to make effective and calculated decisions, it is certainly important to have the
smartest, most proven, business savvy individuals at the helm of the organization. However,
another key component that is often overlooked is the value of diversity of background. We see
it in sports—the teams that are most successful have players in each position that offer unique
strengths to their position, as well as differing backgrounds off the field to bring different views
and strategies to the locker room. The top 11 quarterbacks of all time—undeniably the best
decision makers ever to play in the National Football League (NFL)—would not be able to play
together and create an NFL playoff team, let alone the best team in the league.
On the board of a large corporation, this same diversity of background and skillset is
essential for making the best decisions possible. Women often bring a unique skillset,
background, and perspective to their role, which is why establishing gender diversity on
corporate boards in the United States and other countries around the world makes sense, and
could be hugely beneficial for shareholders.
The issue is not recognizing that many corporations in the United States have a gender
diversity problem. The issue is finding a solution that can work and be effective, without
diminishing the power and effectiveness of the current board, nor decreasing shareholder value
or returns. In 2015, only 19.2% of corporate directors in the Fortune 500 were women. Yet
women comprise approximately half of the U.S. workforce, hold half of all management
positions, are responsible for almost 80% of all consumer spending, and account for 10 million
majority-owned, privately-held firms in the U.S., employing over 13 million people and
generating over $1.9 trillion in sales.1 We have a problem, but this paper is not intended to say
that we have a problem in the U.S. of which companies are not already cognizant. Promoting and
establishing gender diversity on corporate boards of publicly held companies is easier said than
done. The U.S. is the land where capitalism reigns supreme and corporate board decision making
is dominated by shareholder primacy and profits, and government regulation over the structures
of those boards would be seen by many as overreaching.
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In the United States, unlike some states in the European Union, government regulation
and mandates are not the solution to gender diversity issues. Instead, the solutions need to come
from within, so that the corporation can maintain its power and control.
Current State of Gender Diversity Globally
Many European countries have implemented mandatory quotas to increase gender
diversity on corporate boards. In 2011, women represented just 15.2% of United States public
corporate board members.2 The U.S. is by no means the worst performer globally, but aside from
a few countries in Europe, generally there is no equality among genders at the highest levels of
publicly traded companies. Norway is the country that is most often discussed in the world of
corporate gender equality, as their controversial quota law was adopted in 2005, requiring
companies to achieve 40% female board member representation by 2008 and beyond.3 In 2011,
the European average was 11.7%, lower than that of the U.S., but that number is not perfectly
representative, as there is wide variance among EU member states.4 Some countries are
drastically outperforming their neighbors—Norway over 40%, Sweden and Finland at 28.2% and
26%, respectively, and then there are others that greatly lag behind—Germany, Luxembourg,
Italy, and Portugal, with 7%, 6%, 3.6%, and 0.6%, respectively.5
In the Pacific Rim, the outlook is more of the same. Australia leads at just 10.6%,
followed by New Zealand at 9.3% and the Peoples Republic of China at 7.3%.6 It is evident that,
globally, women are not well represented on the boards of some of the largest companies.
Furthermore, some of the numbers above are further skewed high based on the different board
structures in Europe. For example, Germany uses a two-tiered board structure, and the 7% figure
accounts for female board members that serve on the supervisory board as well, which is much
larger in size, but much less powerful in decision-making.7
Since Norway passed its mandatory quota in 2005, other European countries have begun
to follow suit. Germany recently passed legislation requiring 30% of supervisory board seats to
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be held by women.8 The trend across Europe is certainly that gender diversity has become a hot
issue, and regulatory efforts are aimed at decreasing the gender gap.9 In the United States, the
outlook has been just the opposite. From 2004-2011, the U.S. deviated by no more than 0.5% of
female representation on public company boards from year to year.10 However, since 2011, that
trend has mildly begun to change in the U.S., as companies begin to progress in gender diversity,
and are closely approaching the 20%11 mark, thanks to responsiveness to the public and leading
organizations, such as the NFL, which will be discussed in detail below.
Current State of Gender Diversity in the United States
As mentioned above, in 2015 women held 19.2% of board seats in the Fortune 500
companies, which is up from 16.6% in 2012, a time when even 10% of the Fortune 500 had no
women whatsoever on their boards.12 The landscape of gender diversity is improving, but not at
the rate at which it should. Notably, this does paint a somewhat inaccurate picture, as it does not
account for a theme that we see quite often here in the U.S., which is service on multiple boards
merely for the appearance of diversity. Corporations often appoint female board members for the
sake of appearing forward thinking and diverse, when in actuality these women have no real
power to effect change or share their opinion, since some of them serve on up to seven or eight
different boards. It is not possible for one person to attend all of the necessary meetings for each
company, let alone to serve effectively on that many different boards of publicly held companies.
Growth in gender diversity may still be occurring, but we need to first analyze the root causes for
the gender gap before we can implement any effectual changes.
According to a recent survey by McKinsey & Company, the primary obstacle for women
seeking top management positions is often a deep-seeded culture and attitude issue among the
male executives currently in charge.13 Women have said that they are ready to make the
sacrifices in their personal lives to achieve these high ranking management roles, but fear,
8
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possibly rightfully so, that corporate culture would not support their ambitions.14 Some of the
cultural issues that cause these challenges that women face are the lingering doubt on behalf of
many male CEO’s and executives about the value of diversity initiatives, coupled with the
additional stress that is demanded of top executives who are often required to make themselves
available 24/7, which can pose significantly greater challenges for women.15
The second issue of “anytime, anywhere” availability is less persuasive, but the argument
is simply that this mentality tilts more significantly against women because only 62% of women
believe that children can coincide with a C-suite career, compared to 80% of men.16 However,
the argument fails because most men and women agree that running a major public company
requires this heightened availability in order to succeed in the role, so it would appear that
chasing these top management positions requires self-selection from both genders.
The biggest issue for women and career advancement is the lack of support from their
male counterparts, and it is often the case that men outwardly support diversity, but fail to
recognize the many unique challenges faced by women. While about 75% of men agree that
teams with women are more successful, men are less likely to see the value in diversity programs
and often feel that too many gender diversity initiatives become unfair to men.17
Is Change Necessary?
It is evident that women are facing difficulties and obstacles on the path to the top levels
of management, but does that mean that something needs to be done? Ignoring issues of fairness
and equality, there are certainly strong arguments based on the market and company efficiency
that suggest that a greater percentage of females on boards would increase company
performance.18 However, a strong market-efficiency advocate would argue that requiring
companies to hire female directors could actually decrease business performance, and that the
only companies capable of benefitting from an increase in gender diversity are the companies
that voluntarily choose to increase gender diversity.19 A study by Kenneth Ahern and Amy
Dittmar in fact found that a mandatory increase in female directors could actually lower
14
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companies’ share price or earnings.20 Conversely, another salient argument is that women make
the majority of household spending decisions, and therefore to increase female representation on
boards would increase the ability to mirror the market.21 Unfortunately, this argument ignores the
obvious point that many public companies do not manufacture consumer products, and therefore
have no need to mirror the household market. To both of these arguments, the market-efficiency
advocate would maintain that the structure of corporate boards has been designed to maximize
value and efficiency, and so if a board needed more females to increase value, the market would
ensure that more females became directors.22 This appears to be in line with the U.S. legal view
of the market, where there is to some extent a belief that “existing companies have optimized
their mix of directors,” while those that have females benefit from their presence, but those that
do not have concluded that it would reduce performance.23
It is certainly important to note that European companies evidence some of the arguments
for greater company performance after increasing diversity, as the EU has the most empirical
data on the issue, since the U.S. has never issued a mandatory gender quota. That being said,
“greater performance” is sometimes defined as a more socially praiseworthy performance, and
not necessarily improved shareholder vale, share price, earnings or profits, which are the biggest
factors here in the U.S. For example, a female director’s greater reluctance to lay off workers
may hurt the bottom line and share prices may fall, but is this seen as value added by retaining
the jobs and salaries of thousands of workers? This may create problems in the U.S. where
directors are responsive to shareholders—shareholders that are interested in making money and
increasing the return on their investment. Generally, it is the opinion of U.S. shareholders that
socially praiseworthy causes are beneficial if they keep that company in the news, and the
American public generally looks favorably upon the actions of the company, and therefore will
purchase great quantities of the company’s product or services. Admittedly, this is the cynic’s
view of the American market, but there is certainly a valid argument to say that socially
20
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praiseworthy causes that are simply for the sake of helping others, but not deriving share value,
are of little to no interest for a disinterested shareholder. Profits drive business decisions at the
end of the day in the cynical, capitalist, and arguably American view.
However, it could certainly be the case that we are seeing the carriage come before the
horse in this situation. The true market-efficiency advocate rationale may just be the argument
put forth by large corporations that intend to keep doing things the way they always have. There
is evidence, as shown by the McKinsey study above24, that women are not being given equal
opportunities to reach top level management because of past opinions held about their gender,
and corporations have an interest in limiting the regulations that the government enforces upon
them. Therefore, we must question whether we are simply seeing corporations defending their
current actions, due to inflexibility and unwillingness to change, or is the market-efficiency test a
valid argument here in the United States? Whether or not there is agreement with either side of
the statement above, it is certainly true that the view in the U.S. is that the market is better than
the government at regulation, and it is one of the most core principles underpinning the
foundation of the U.S. economy. Therefore, as will be discussed later, changes to increase gender
diversity cannot come in the form of mandatory regulation in its strictest sense, but will need to
be uniquely tailored to allow corporate control, yet still become effective in increasing women at
the top.
Linda Senden argues that tough top-down regimes for change, such as the mandatory
quotas that have become prevalent in Europe, are the most effective option.25 However, she
makes an argument that effectiveness is in the eye of the beholder, noting that effectiveness can
either be judged by equal outcomes or the creation of equal opportunities.26 America is the land
of opportunity, and to base our regulations on equal outcomes would be seen by many as an
intrinsic violation of this country’s founding economic principles. Mitt Romney said it during his
campaign in 2012: “America is more than just a place. America is an idea. It’s the only country
founded on an idea. Our rights come from nature and God, not from government. … We promise
equal opportunity, not equal outcomes. And this idea was founded on the principles of freedom,
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free enterprise, self-determination and government by consent of the governed.”27 Linda argues
for the effectiveness of these tough top-down regimes as a “fast” means of achieving change, but
is fast what is best for shareholders and the business?28 The voluntary bottom-up self-regulation
regimes would be far more successful in the United States, especially since a large-scale
overhaul of the board is never a safe bet. Slow, incremental changes toward our goal would have
a far greater likelihood of acceptance among publicly held corporations.
Changes certainly need to be made, but it may not be the best course of action to follow
the example of many successful European countries that have shown tremendous growth in
gender diversity through the use of mandatory quotas. To do so could undermine the very
attribute that makes the American marketplace what it is. The laissez-faire economic system
works for the United States and to overhaul that could prove to be a grave mistake in a time
when we are already concerned with keeping American companies on American soil and
keeping the corporate earnings of U.S. companies here at home, rather than abroad.
Quotas and Other Mechanisms for Change
In Europe, the status of gender representation falls into a wide range, but on average is
better than the state of the U.S. Gender diversity in Europe currently ranges from 7.9%
representation on corporate boards by women in Portugal, to 35.5% in Norway, though eight
European countries have greater representation by women on boards than the U.S. Much of
Europe, including Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Norway have instituted or are considering
legislation to institute mandatory quotas requiring a certain percentage of board seats to be filled
by women. These legislative measures have been met with some skepticism, as companies that
value their independence feel that their boards are comprised the way they are because a rational
decision has been made to only select the candidates which are going to be most effective for the
company’s goals. Another criticism or fear is that these quotas may be promoting diversity, but
hurting the financial results of companies. Essentially, critics have argued that the female
directors may either be promoted merely as figureheads, or even worse, that untrained or
inexperienced women would be promoted to boards in order for companies to come into
27
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compliance with the quotas quickly.29 In the first scenario, the problem is that these women are
not actually promoting the goals intended by gender diversity, which is to provide a new
perspective and unique experiences to the existing board. Furthermore, in both scenarios the
female board members could be taking the seats of potential board members that would have
been prepared to effectively govern. There are many hard and soft measures that could be
implemented to solve the gender diversity problem in the United States, but the softer measures
are far more likely to gain traction in U.S. economic culture.
Mandatory Quotas
Across Europe, countries have been implementing mandatory gender diversity quotas on
corporate boards. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway have quotas ranging from
30-40%.30 Norway was the first to adopt a mandatory quota in 2005, requiring public companies
to achieve a quota of 40% of female directors by 2008, which has been successful.31 Spain
followed suit, also mandating a 40% target by the year 2016, so it remains to be seen whether
companies will come into full compliance, but as the trend across the EU shows, it is highly
likely to be the case.32 Spain has the potential to shed new light on the attainability of a high
quota, as Spanish public companies have a steep hill to climb, since the average percentage of
female directors on corporate boards was 5% at the time of the law’s adoption.33 As we have
seen in the United States in the past, there can be adverse consequences to mandatory quota laws,
as companies will do what is necessary in order to avoid penalties, which does not always
accomplish the goal of the legislation. It cannot be disputed that the goal of mandatory gender
quotas is to increase the percentage of females on corporate boards for the sake of affording
women equal opportunities in employment and advancement. In 2006 in the United States,
“Susan Bayh, wife of former Senator Evan Bayh, sat on eight boards.”34 Shortly after the quota
law was passed in Norway, one woman was elected to the boards of 18 different companies.35 It
is simply not possible for any human to effectively serve on that many different boards, and
29
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provide value to each one. It is unlikely that Susan or anyone else in a similar position has any
significant influence on any one of the boards, let alone all 8 or 18 of them, which does nothing
to increase opportunities for females to break through the glass ceiling.
These countries represent the use of the “stick” for gender diversity initiatives, rather than
the “carrot,” though we will look at some of those as well. The mandatory quota does not fit
within the United States culture of company and investor choice, capitalism and the free market
economy, and our overall laissez-faire economic system.36 Furthermore, there is another deep
seeded reason for the United States’ avoidance of the word “quota,” which is that it would
certainly be challenged as unconstitutional. Even if the mandatory quotas won acceptance in the
United States, they would face constitutional questioning, as a potential violation of the Equal
Protections Clause of the Constitution.37
The laissez-faire culture of the U.S. economy has been cultivated over many years, and a
quota does not seem to fit within the U.S. system, even ignoring constitutional issues. In more
recent history, we have even seen the disappearance of many labor unions and there are simply
not as many regulations requiring large equity holders to listen to the opinions of other
stakeholders. Proponents of quotas or other mandatory legislation have argued that the
government strongly regulates securities law, so therefore this regulation would not be
completely new. This argument fails to recognize that the securities regulations primarily deal
with the issues of disclosure of vital information, but do not regulate the actions of companies to
the extent that a quota would. The United States favors shareholder primacy and market selfregulation. A mandatory quota simply does not fit within that framework.
Mandatory Disclosure
Recently, the United States has enacted legislation known as “Say on Pay,” which
requires publicly held companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of the highest paid
executive, often the CEO, to the median employee. This data is not new data. We can generally
guess, moderately accurately with minimal research, the range of salary that a median employee
at a company receives, and the highest paid executive’s salary is required to be disclosed.
Therefore, Americans and anyone else that is interested could have calculated the ratio between
36
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these two salaries or compensation packages on their own, with some margin of guessing error.
It is safe to say that most people have never made this calculation. Americans could also fairly
easily find out the ratio of male to female directors that sit on the boards of the largest publicly
traded companies in the country. Again, most people do not look at this ratio on their own.
If the SEC enacted legislation requiring companies to either disclose a ratio or percentage
of female directors, it may put the issue of gender diversity just enough into the spotlight to
provide an avenue for change. It remains to be seen whether the Say on Pay legislation will have
any effect on executive compensation. If it is effective in either lowering executive compensation
or increasing compensation from the bottom, then it could be evidence that simply disclosing
gender diversity information could increase the number of females as directors.
The SEC has already required that companies disclose board members’ qualifications and
whether the nomination committees consider diversity.38 It would not be a far stretch to include
the gender diversity of sitting board members. The SEC did in fact amend Regulation S-K Item
4079(c)(2)(vi) “to require corporations with a diversity policy to disclose how the policy is
implemented and how the nominating committee ‘assesses the effectiveness of its policy.’”39 The
major issue is that the current regulations on considering diversity in the board member
nomination process are weak, and for this method to be effective, the questions need to be
improved. In fact, Regulation S-K does not actually define the term diversity, nor does it require
a board to consider diversity in the nomination process.40 Anne L. Alstott recommends “a
stronger disclosure strategy [that] might pose sharper questions: Are directors familiar with
studies of gender bias in decision-making? Did the board take steps to cast a wide net for
potential directors? How many women were interviewed for recent positions? How does the
board intend to address diversity in the future?”41 This potentially viable option for increasing
gender diversity on corporate boards would only require amended legislation to ask more pointed
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and specific questions as part of mandatory SEC disclosure, in order to create actual
responsibility of compliance on publicly traded corporations.
Tax Incentives
Another option for promoting gender diversity would be to provide tax incentives on a
sliding scale for companies that reach a certain threshold or percentage of gender diversity on a
yearly basis.42 Enkelena Gjuka advocates for a seven-year tax program enacted by Congress to
increase gender diversity to 20% by the year 2020.43 Gjuka proposes a tax credit for every
female that is nominated to the board, and gives two reasons for imposing the seven year
provision: (1) by setting a time constraint, it encourages companies to promote females quickly,
since the tax credits would only be a limited time offer; and (2) by 2020 Gjuka argues that tax
credits will no longer be needed, as corporations will have realized the benefit of greater female
board representation.44 However, this argument is not fully salient, because although there is
empirical evidence that supports stronger performance by companies that have greater female
representation, there is also the market-efficiency argument on the other side, as discussed above,
which says that the number of female directors has already been optimized for maximal firm
performance.45
Gjuka’s argument46 does not account for the fact that there is a strong possibility that
women are not promoted to corporate boards because of deep-seeded attitudes about their
capabilities from the male executives. It is possible that male executives’ attitude toward women
is what is keeping them from board representation, not necessarily a fear that increasing female
representation would hurt stock performance. Therefore, if the tax incentives are removed by
year 2020, is that really enough time to remove the attitudes of the other 80% of the board
members that are male? Furthermore, once the tax incentives are removed, corporations could
certainly find crafty ways to unseat the females that provided the tax incentive, and immediately
drop back below the 20% threshold of board representation.

42

Id. at 49.
Gjuka, supra note 39.
44
Id.
45
See supra Are Changes Necessary?
46
See generally Gjuka, supra note 39.
43

11

Voluntary Pledges
Some countries in Europe have gone a route drastically different from the mandatory
quota regime, and have taken strides that have been effective, and would possibly be accepted by
U.S. companies. In 2008, the Dutch implemented a “Talent to the Top” program, which required
companies to add women to their boards, but only if they subscribed to the pledge to do so.47 In
2006 the Dutch corporate boards averaged only 7% female representation, but that number had
increased to 20.9% by 2010.48 The “Talent to the Top” program does not impose any strict
requirements on who must sign, or how many women must be elevated to board member status,
but considers the “specific circumstances within the organization.”49 There is no punishment for
any company that does not comply with the pledge, except that the company will not be listed on
the Talent to the Top website as a pledge company.50 The public and the consumers are the only
ones that can hold the companies accountable.51 Even with this voluntary structure, the pledge
has been signed and implemented by the 110 largest Dutch companies, such as Shell, Heineken,
and Wolters Kluer.52
The voluntary nature of this program could work in the U.S. where corporations value
their freedom to make decisions unilaterally, and without input from the government. It cannot
be overstated that, in general, corporations in the U.S. believe the market is the best regulator of
best business practices. That being said, the objective of increasing gender diversity on corporate
boards is becoming more and more of a hot issue. Using peer pressure to influence change could
be a viable option for increasing gender diversity in the U.S., because if some of the large
household names within the Fortune 500 begin signing on to a gender diversity pledge, it is only
a matter of time before the rest follow suit. Google would not want to be seen by the public and
its consumers as uncommitted to diversity if Microsoft signs on to a pledge program and makes
immediate strides of improvement. Voluntary pledges are the most viable option discussed thus
far for the U.S., but determining the structure of a successful program is vital.
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Voluntary Targets and the NFL’s Rooney Rule
In early August 2015, The White House held its first Demo Day, highlighting the work of
female and minority entrepreneurs.53 “President Barack Obama issued a call to action to the tech
industry, asking companies to step up their game on workforce diversity.”54 14 tech companies
responded to the call to action, including giants Facebook and Pinterest—who had actually
announced plans to roll out their own “Rooney Rule” earlier in the summer—which would
require these companies to consider at least one woman and one minority in the slate of
candidates for either every open position, or every open senior position, depending on the
company.55 This new buzzword in the tech industry has come to be known as the “Rooney
Rule.”
After the 2001 National Football League (NFL) season, 67% of the players in the league
were African-American, but only 6% of the league’s head coaches, two, were AfricanAmerican.56 Dan Rooney, President of the Pittsburgh Steelers, was appointed by the NFL to lead
the Committee on Work Place Diversity for the NFL.57 By 2003, the NFL had adopted the
Rooney Rule, which mandated that all teams consider a minority candidate as a finalist for any
opening in the head coach or general manager position, and to conduct an on-site interview with
that candidate.58 By 2010, the number of African-American coaches in the NFL had increased
from 6% to 22%.59
On November 4, 2010, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar joked that he is often confused
with the Commissioner of the Southeastern Conference—the other SEC.60 In that luncheon
speech, Commissioner Aguilar supported the Rooney Rule, noting that the NFL’s rule could be
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applied to corporate board composition, and specifically, applying the rule as a model for a
pledge program, like those outlined above.61
The NFL has seen great success because of the Rooney Rule, and NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell recently expanded the coverage of the Rooney Rule, speaking at the first
“Women’s Summit” at Super Bowl 50.62 The Thursday prior to Super Bowl 50, Goodell
announced that the NFL would extend the Rooney Rule to require interviewing female
candidates for executive positions.63
The Rooney Rule has propelled the NFL exponentially forward with respect to women
around the game. This year, the NFL saw its first female coaches and female officials on the
field, in Jen Welter and Sarah Thomas, respectively.64 The Buffalo Bills followed suit, adding a
female coach as well, Kathryn Smith.65 It is quite possibly the perfect time for U.S. companies to
follow the example set by the NFL—an organization that undoubtedly cares about profits over
many other social issues, if you ask Dr. Omalu for his opinion.66 This system would not force
corporate boards to hire or fire anyone specifically, but simply consider diversity at the final
stages of the interview and candidacy process. “The NFL moved from lip service to action and
the results are self-explanatory. It is time for the legal profession and the financial services
industry to do the same.”67
United States Wrap-Up
The United States prides itself on leadership and the ability to promote and influence
global initiatives. Currently, the U.S. is lagging behind some of its European counterparts as it
relates the female executives on the boards of publicly traded companies. Due to the culture and
structure of the U.S. financial and economic systems, change cannot necessarily come from the
same avenues as it has in many countries across the Atlantic. The U.S. values shareholder

61

Id.; supra Voluntary Pledges.
Kevin Patra, Roger Goodell: NFL creating a Rooney Rule for women, NFL.COM (Feb. 4, 2016)
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000632320/article/goodell-nfl-creating-a-rooney-rule-for-women.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Interview with Dr. Bennet Omalu, League of Denial: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, PBS.ORG, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/the-frontline-interview-dr-bennet-omalu/
(interviewing Dr. Omalu as he shares his process of discovering CTE and the NFL’s reaction to his findings about
its concussion problem among NFL players and the brain disease they would suffer later in life).
67
Aguilar, supra note 60.
62

14

primacy and believes in the market’s ability to self-regulate. In order to promote and increase
gender diversity, change must come from within, or at least appear to. Corporations need to feel
empowered to make the decision that is in their best interests—a policy which can be achieved
under the Rooney Rule. The Rooney Rule has the advantages of both quotas and voluntary
pledge programs. The Rooney Rule is not a mandatory quota, because there would be no
requirement on how many women are hired to fill board seats. Theoretically, a company is not
under any obligation to fill a single seat on its board with a female under the Rooney Rule. The
Rooney Rule is simply an interview quota, requiring there to be a certain percentage of female
candidates in the final round of interviews, which includes an on-site interview and a tour of the
facilities (potential facilities would likely be the headquarters or nucleus of business for a large
corporation). The Rooney Rule is effective in creating change that benefits minorities, but comes
with the added advantage that the corporations are actively selecting the candidates that they
want to hire from a larger pool of candidates that includes males candidates, therefore greatly
decreasing the likelihood that female board members would ever be seen as mere “quota fillers”
or met with resentment. Mandatory quotas and governmental regulation will not be met without
severe pushback, and could be seen by many as the opening of a potential floodgate into
governmental regulation of the markets. The U.S. can move the gender diversity initiative
forward on a global scale, but it must be done in a way that does not threaten the culture and
values of the current system.
The Rooney Rule, and other voluntary pledge programs like it, has the ability to increase
gender diversity on corporate boards in a meaningful way that gives real power and influence to
the females that it benefits. It is beneficial to shareholders because boards are not forced to
change practices or composition, or hire anyone specifically, but the Rooney Rules is still able to
promote equality among genders at the executive levels of corporate America.
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Part II
Introduction
Would the world be in this financial mess if it had been Lehman Sisters? was a question
raised at the World Economic Forum in Davos 200968, following the financial crisis. This
question triggered international debates looking at the situation of gender diversity on corporate
boards, which intensively influence our market system and workday life. This paper provides an
overview of the history and present state of actions and laws establishing gender diversity on
corporate boards by the European Union, Germany and other Member and Non-Member States.
We will examine self-enforced voluntary legal actions, as well as, mandatory enforced equality
laws, like a binding quota. Subsequently, we will be able to understand how the EU and its
Member States justify these legal measures, while illuminating the differences between
economic reasoning and a value based approach.
European and German Basic Approaches for Achieving Gender Diversity
European Union
“While women make up at least half of the population, their share in the exercise of
political and economic power has remained at a very low level even in the 21st century.”69 The
lack of women’s participation in the EU and the economy in general, affects especially their
representation in companies and corporate boards.70 The EU-average for women in high
management roles of large listed company boards is still rather low at 17.8 % with significant
cross-country differences—the lowest in Malta at 2.1% and the highest in Finland at 29.8%.71
The EU’s average for women represented in executive positions is staggeringly low compared to
the non-EU member Norway, with an average of 42%.72 Female representation in CEO positions
is even lower throughout the EU with less than three females in CEO positions out of the
hundreds of the largest listed companies in Europe.73
Looking at the EU’s history on sex equality, 1965 ex Art. 119 EEC (later Art. 141 EC),
was the main law in stating the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, fighting unfair
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competition between Member States.74 This is equivalent to today’s Art. 157 TFEU75: equal pay
for work of equal value, which ensures Member States’ positive discrimination actions.76 A
further progress in favor of gender equality was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which added to Art. 3
the “aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.”77 Further
labor equality issues initiatives of EU institutions outside of the normal social and political
agendas included the first European Ministerial Conference in 1986, which created the Equality
between Women and Men in Political Life—Policy and Strategies to Achieve Equality in
Decision Making.78 In 1988, the Committee of Ministers introduced the Declaration on Equality
Between Women and Men, declaring gender equality as an essential human right and essential
for democracy.79 This was followed by the Third European Commission’s Pluriannual Action
Program (1991-1995), which added women to decision-making issues.80 Connected to the
program’s implementation in 1996, a Recommendation by the Council, addressed the Member
States to pursue a holistic way of achieving a balanced female representation in “decisionmaking bodies at all levels of […] economic life.”81 The Council of Europe focused on its idea of
equality, declared in The Declaration on Equality Between Women and Men as a fundamental
criterion of democracy in Istanbul 1997, supporting equal power distribution by overcoming
fixed gender stereotypes, such as the need for more men in domestic duties by demanding
“structural change” and “new social order.”82 In 2009, a Declaration by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe embodied the equality concept as an essential democratic
value, demanding “equal visibility, empowerment, responsibility and participation of both
women and men in all spheres of public and private life.”83
In March 2011, the European Commission instituted a voluntary pledge for companies to
achieve 30% female representation on company boards by 2014 and 40% by 2020, but the plan
was never realized because by 2012 only 24 companies agreed to the pledge.84 This led to the
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Commission’s Directive, based on the aforementioned 2011 pledge, which enforced that all
companies embodied the mandatory 40% on their boards by 2020.85 The latest Commission
initiative is the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-201986: promoting “gender
balance in economic leadership positions at least 40 % representation of the under-represented
sex among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges” and “equality in
decision-making […] among executive directors of major listed companies and in the talent
pipeline.”87 This initiative seizes suggestions from the 1997 Ministerial Conference in Istanbul
and is based on the 2012 Commission’s directive (vide supra).
Germany
The EU overrules national decisions, as a supreme organ of legal procedures. Member
States developed individual legal actions for female leadership in company boards even before
the restrictive EU approach of the above illustrated Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality
2016-2019 came into account. For a long time in Germany it was not clear whether to approach
the problem of female under-representation on company boards with corporate governance tools
or with other means. The German government agreed in 2001 to cooperate with principal
business associations on a proposal to promote the equality of women in company boards and
decision-making positions in the private economy.88 This soft law measure was implemented
under the notion that the government would not apply any further gender equality legislations
unless it is obliged to do so by EU law.89 The agreement manifested in a gender diversity
provision in the German Corporate Governance Code Art. 4.1.5: “When filling managerial
positions in the enterprise the Management Board shall take diversity into consideration and, in
particular, aim for an appropriate consideration of women.”90 It should be emphasized that the
German wording (soll) makes the provision non-binding, along with the lack of clarifying when
and how the sought “appropriateness” will be rated.91 Nevertheless, most of the German stock
listed companies set different targets regarding female representation in their boards, ranging

85

European commission Press Release, 2012.
EU Comission, Staff working document, 2015, 21.
87
EU Comission, Staff working document, 2015, 21.
88
Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 54.
89
Waas, Gender Quota in Company Boards, 2014, 131.
90
German Corporate Governance Code, amended on May 5th 2015, BAnZ June 12th 2015.
91
Senden, Utrecht Law Review, 2014, 54.
86

18

from 20% to 30% up until 2011.92 Because the percentage of representation has increased from
about 11% to 22%, in the following three years, the so called legal comply-or-explain duty,
implicated in the German Stock Corporation Act (Section 161)93 came into action.94 In 2015, the
law on Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the Private and Public
Sector95 was introduced. On January 1, 2016, a fixed gender quota of 30% came into force in
Art. 1 sect. 4, para. 1 applying to new supervisory board seats of major companies listed on the
stock exchange. Around 350096 more companies were obliged to set their own target to increase
the female proportion of supervisory boards, board of directors and top management level
through Art. 3 sect. 76 para. 4 Stock Corporation Act.97 The law aims at improving the
proportion of women in leading positions and to achieve a gender balance (Art. 1 sect. 1).
Manuela Schwesig, current German Federal Minister of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women
and Youth states that: “the law is an historic step for the equal rights of women in Germany.
Hence the law not only acts in leadership positions, but reaches millions of women concretely.”98
This quota regulation is effective through Art. 11 No. 2 b for stock corporations and limited
partnerships on stocks with more than 2000 female and male employees and European
Companies (SE), where the supervisory and administrative body consists of the same number of
shareholders and labor representatives99. In case of non-compliance, the election is void and
intended chairs for the underrepresented sex stay legally vacant (“empty chair”), Art. 14 No. 1
a.100
Critics fear a violation of the principles of equal treatment, Art. 3 para. 2 GG101 and of nondiscrimination, Art. 3 para. III GG by the quota.102
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Different Justifications for Legal Actions Promoting Gender Diversity:
Economic Advantages vs. Constitutional Values
To understand the reasons for pursuing gender diversity on company boards it is vital to
scrutinize suitable measures e.g., out of economic benefits, or moral values for the society,
politics and law.
Economic Reasoning
A financial argument for gender diversity, is the economic, business case argument
pursuing a business’s need for more gender balanced boards to improved company’s
efficiency103, (though there is skepticism about its actual outcome104) improving quality of
decision-making, corporate governance and ethics, as well as resorts of the talent pool, leading to
innovation and market presentation.105 Specific actions, based on economic reasoning, are often
soft law measures: “Self-regulatory approaches may be induced [...] by the business case
rationale and developed […] as part of corporate social responsibility policy, as reflected in
corporate governance codes.”106 An example is the Polish Warsaw Stock Exchange Management
Board which connects gender balanced participation creativity and innovation of business’s
economic actions or the Swedish Corporate Governance Board companies need to maintain need
to a responsible and sustainable behavior, comprising gender equality, thus becoming
trustworthy in public.107
Value Justification
A value-oriented reason for gender diversity is the individual, equal opportunities
justification: achieving a gender power balance corporate boards is linked to individual fairness.
Equally qualified women should have equal access like men to boards, which would be
beneficial for the society as a whole “affect[ing] the economic, financial and social life of all
citizens.”108
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Moreover the societal, public interest and fundamental rights argument focusses broadly
on a balanced representation through social justice and democratic legitimacy. These are EU core
values, which build a political and economic system in which in legal terms translates into the
principle of equality and of equal opportunities.109 Experience showed that in Member States
without specific regulation no major critical awareness has risen to actively support gender
balance. None of the mentioned justifications have been sufficient or convincing by the public
regulator or by industry to act. These nations trust in the application of the general thought of
equality, but no proactive approach to overcome persisting inequalities in this domain have
arisen yet.110
Different National Value Types
Compared to this the Norwegian quota model is rather invasive, not justified through the
business case rationale, but the claim that achieving equal participation is a democratic value,
seeing equality as a contribution for fairness, power balance and affluence in society.111 This is a
prime example that international differences affect regulatory and enforcement choices, reasons
for international differences. Firstly they are influenced by the Member State’s type of political
and welfare system and cultural differences: Diverse political, socio-economic and cultural
contexts in which companies and employees work affect the problem of under-representation, as
well as, regulatory solutions and instruments built to resolve it.112 “The proportion of women on
corporate boards is likely to be lower in countries exhibiting high masculinity.”113 In the UK for
instance which is typified as a liberal welfare system114, the self-regulatory approach still
prevails.115
In a few countries, pro-active measures were only taken due to strict legal regulation
where no active measures came up, no legal or political tradition and have been applied. France
requires legislative and constitutional checks before any quota rules may be adopted.116 Before
the quota rule came to force in Germany, doubts covered the constitutionality, the conformity
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with the freedom of property, the freedom of association, and the principle of equality are
understood under the German Constitution.117 In Finland, the currently applicable constitutional
provision would only allow for a soft quota system.118 In Norway, the introduction of the hard
quota was received easier because these rules already existed in the legal system and have been
enforced in other fields, which left their constitutionality doubtless.119
Economic Reasoning Overshadows Values
“There is a large gap between the proportion of employed and well-educated women and
those sitting on the boards of EU companies.”120 Looking at the above presented Commission’s
proposal for a Directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of
companies listed on stock exchanges does not seem to be a convenient legal solution: “The
Commission’s reasoning [of] the draft Directive is so strongly pervaded by economic
considerations that it gives the impression that women are merely instruments useful to attain
economic objectives.”121 The urge to promote female representation could be justified rather by
social oriented values, including gender equality, as well as the necessity of democratic
legitimization of the EU and of its economic governance to promote the tandard of
proportionality and subsidiarity.122 Gender equality among European company managers could
find justification in EU constitutional values like the equality between women and men Art. 23
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the social market economy, Art. 3 para. 3 TEU
and democracy, Art. 2 TEU. As well as in the general rule of EU law, Article 6 para. 3 TEU.123
Furthermore critics utter there might be no correlation between advanced economic performance
due to a higher female proportion which offers an excuse for companies to prlongue the need and
value of having more female representation on the boards.124 “Corporate governance and
performance may be improved by board appointments of the best possible candidates
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(irrespective of sex) and meeting all relevant criteria, not simply by the appointment of
women.”125
Comply or explain approach
One solution to quota skepticism is the comply-or-explain approach for diversity.126 The
best known proposal where "companies with a lower proportion, less than 30% women on their
boards, would have to explain [in their annual reports] if they proposed to fill a vacancy with a
man."127. Research found out that by asking why individuals took certain actions advance the
decision-making quality, reduce stereotype thinking, and create space for underrepresented
groups.128 Diversity rulings are often introduced as essential to good governance, an example for
comply or explain approach requirements is: “listing rules of several stock exchanges require as
part of their agreement with listed companies that the companies ‘comply’ with governance
requirements or ‘explain’ why they do not.”.129 The European Council is planning a directive
requiring large publicly traded firms to present their board diversity-policy and its results,
corporations without that policy, must provide a "clear and reasoned explanation as to why this is
the case."130 Denmark created two laws since 2012: the Gender Equality Act and the Companies
Act. The laws make it obligatory for private and public companies to set concrete and realistic
aims and establishing a recruitment policy, including a comply-or-explain approach. (companies
must disclose annually about the implementation this policy and, explain why the objective was
not realized. If it fails to report on this, a fine may be imposed.131
Legal Instruments in Action in the EU
Legislations of many EU Member States have quotas or mandatory targets which regulate
gender proportions on company boards, varying in sanctions and number of corporations. States
operating with obligatory targets for female presence on individual company boards impose
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sanctions for non-compliance. Others have softer statutory quota laws, which are neither binding
nor connected to any injunctions. The legislation of a few countries only concerns state owned
corporations or local authorities (excluding private companies). Countries with the least
developed quotas for public undertakings came into force through administrative regulation,
without direct legislation.132
Quota
Hard public law is one way to achieve gender diversity, by introducing binding quota
regimes. The non-EU Member State Norway is an international role model for hard public law in
2006, introducing a legal sanctioned quota that mandates representation of 40% of both genders
on company boards, for both public limited and state-owned companies.133. The quota became
mandatory as companies failed to raise female representation under the soft law.134 The sanction
for non-compliance is forced liquidation.135 Also the registration of company boards is
prohibited if the balanced representation is not reached.136 Supportively, the Norwegian
government set up a database for companies where qualified female applicants can have their
CVs evaluated.137 The majority of companies succeeded in complying with the quota within the
two-year transition period. 138
Other European countries followed, most recently Germany, like stated above. France
passed a quota law requiring listed and non-listed major private, and state owned companies, to
uphold a gender proportion of at least 40%.139 Corporations with only male board members
should fill any vacant seat with a woman, the sanction in case of legal non-compliance means the
invalidity of any director’s assignment.140 Legislative mandatory gender quotas are largely
politically debated but are considered more and more. Like in Belgium, since 2011, concerning
public undertakings, the law demands “at least a third of the members of the board of directors
appointed by the Belgian State or by a company controlled by the Belgian State shall be of a
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different gender from the other members”.141 If the company does not comply, the following
director’s appointment will be null.142 An Italian Act regulates “that [more] company statutes
must ensure that directors and auditors of one sex cannot be elected in a proportion greater than
two-thirds compared to directors and auditors of the opposite sex”143 of listed companies and
state subsidiaries.144 The National Securities and Exchange Commission is in charge of
controlling this process and can warn that the quota application should comply within four
months and, if non-compliant a fine up to 1 million € (up to 200.000 € for auditors) can follow; if
no action took place by a second warning if the quota is not achieved within three months. If the
company fails to implement this, dissolution of the board might occur.145
Alternate Legal Instruments
“Quotas are not the end of the possibilities for securing female representation in
corporations, and more generally, in the workplace.”146 There are different tactical categories,
like focusing on increasing the candidate’s skills, motivating corporations to take voluntary
actions and the law. To increase the representation of women on boards, state authorities or
corporations can adopt corporate governance codes individually; companies can sign charters,
certificates or pledges realizing quantitative aims for female boardroom-representation;
stakeholders can initiate special recruiting, training, mentoring and networking activities.147
Moreover databases promoting female candidates could be created, or campaigns raising the
sensitivity of social partners and businesses towards gender balance in boardrooms148.
Regulatory approaches of boards’ gender balance range from no regulatory action to softer in
public and private institutions. In some Member States self- or co-regulatory and public law
approaches may come to force parallel, because of the distinction between private and stateowned companies, and left to their discretion.149 The softest of all approaches can be achieved
through so called conditioned self-regulation or co-regulation. Those and other measures are

141

Arts. 2, 5 of the Law of 28 July 2011, in De Vos & Culliford, 2014, 101.
Senden, Utrecht Law Review 2014, 57.
143
Senden, Utrecht Law Review 2014, 58.
144
Renga, Italy, in Selanec & Senden 2013, 127.
145
Renga, Italy, in Selanec & Senden 2013, 125.
146
Kristen, 26 Pace International Law Review 68, 2014, 78.
147
Szydło, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2014, 172 f.
148
Progress Report of the European Commission, March 2012, 13–14, 21 f.
149
Senden, Utrecht Law Review 2014, 52.
142

25

essential for raising public awareness, employees and company management need to change
organizational practices and consensus-building.150 To achieve cultural change in the
organization of corporation’s acceptance, flexibility and a positive framing is more effective than
punishment.151 For instance Finland selected a self-regulatory approach implemented through the
Corporate Governance Code for public and private corporations in 2010, not explicitly
demanding an equal gender distribution of board seats, the required action are left to the
employers own execution.152 The Hungarian Equality Act only demands an adoption of an equal
opportunity plan only for public employers, (without content-scrutiny and only soft provisions)
not adopting such a plan imposes fine.153 Mostly initiatives by public authorities setting certain
quantitative targets, which are of little legally binding nature and sanctions of non-achievement
and non-compliance:154 Spain recommended in a law of 2007 that major corporations should
reach at least 40% of each gender on company boards before 2015155, but no sanctions are
attached to this rule, only a duty for companies to state their board’s gender composition of in
their annual reports.156 Ireland set a target in 2011 of 40% of each gender for all state boards, till
today this does not have any legal implication.157 No specific measures (like from the legislator)
promoting gender diversity yet have been adopted, in mainly the latest EU-acceded Member
States, like in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech republic, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and
Slovakia, as well as in founding EU Member States: Luxembourg and Portugal.158 Where there is
no binding public regulation, initiatives make corporations pay attention to gender imbalances:
mostly within corporate governance codes (which often only apply to stock listed companies),
and are phrased rather widely, not setting any hard standards.159 The Dutch Talent to the Top
program created an online platform where companies can publicly pledge to commit themselves
to promoting gender diversity, which is very much voluntary and without any sanctions.160 The
UK introduced the FTSE 100 Cross-Company Mentoring Executive Programme, offering
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mentoring and related services to high-potential women within the 100 highest value stock
companies on the London Stock Exchange, the aim is the connection of women, Chief
Executives and Chairmen.161 Forcing corporations to give information about retention,
recruitment, and the promotion of women, creates transparency162, would open the companies’
consciousness concerning inclusion of women, preventing discrimination.163 Another necessity is
their search expansion, beyond traditional CEO types, considering different corporate executives,
nonprofit directors and officers, and academic presidents and experts.164 “What's holding women
back [is] the fact that no one ever leaves the boards."165 Board members do not want to give up
their power, linked to prestige and a high salary.166 This leads to an increasing average age of
directors: 40% of public corporation managers are age 68 or older.167
Legal strategies can remove obstacles to women, wishing to enter in leadership positions.
An idea is demanding companies "over a certain size to disclose data concerning recruitment,
retention, and promotion."168 Another legal strategy would be to strengthen enforcement
resources for anti-discrimination initiatives. Still state and federal equal opportunity agencies
could be more proactive in investigating organizations with a poor performance on gender
equity.169
Does Diversity Pay Off?
How to Access Diversity
As we have seen above in Chapter (IV), the business case argument for diversity on
corporate boards is generally the most striking legitimization for mandatory quota laws, even if
lesser used than the value approach. Today several studies exist, indicating positive correlations
between enhanced female representation on company boards and a better business
performance.170 At the same time, negative or simply no significant outcome is also often
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determined.171 Evaluation of effectiveness depends on whether we see the main goal in a creation
of potential equal opportunities between men and women, or if we just judge the de facto equal
representation on company boards.172 While the equal opportunity attempt is often
institutionalized by self-regulatory and soft gender equality laws, the outcome orientated
approach is often embodied by different hard quota regimes, as mentioned in Chapter (V).173
Also the EU Commission concluded that: “legal instruments to enforce quotas are effective and
fast means of achieving change”174, and commits itself thereby to hard quota law enforcements.
In its Draft Direction uses arguments, based on three economic advantages, which are also the
main argumentative pillars in the other, considerable body of literature:175 At first it is often
mentioned that a more balanced allocation among the sexes in corporate boards would enhance
productivity through a more efficiently used workforce.176 Secondly, it is argued that gender
equality in corporate boards leads to a better decision-making and monitoring of the companies
actions.177 This assumption rests on theories, highlighting the idea that women were “more
financially risk averse”178, while others believe in a wider variety of viewpoints179 or a better
resistance to internal board conflicts.180 However, the third economic advantage is the
assumption, that increased female representation on corporate boards leads to an overall better
financial performance (at the stock market, overall profits and foreign invested capital) of the
company.181
Looking at the most mentioned disadvantages of gender diversity on corporate boards,
we can divide those into two kinds of arguments. Those doubting the research validly, predicting
a positive correlation and those who claim disadvantages are caused by enhanced gender
diversity on boards directly. Despite the comprehensive researches, there seems no clear
evidence that diversity leads vice versa to an improved financial performance.182 Many studies
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are overshadowed by the reproach of “serious methodological flaws”183, while the critique is: a
selective approach choosing the companies’ financial parameters, that they only portray the
wanted positive relationship.184 Moreover the studies often do exhibit their selection pattern, how
the companies were chosen.185 Another point of criticism is the short-term periods of the
mentioned studies,186 therefore a long-term observation of the company’s stock market
shareholder value is not connectable to diversity specific findings.187
The different studies are connected to country-, cultural- and company-specific backgrounds,
which often preclude the view of a wider, global market context.188 Because of this, the
correlation between diversity and financial benefits is often of an anticipated and indirect
nature.189 For example, some scholars claim that the female representation on boards has no
direct financial impact, but due to its appearance as a diverse board, shareholders may invest
convinced of the company’s innovativeness.190 This argument is underlined by the fact that
studies which predict a positive financial correlation, often derive from countries without an
enforced legal gender quota.191 Furthermore, some mentioned disadvantages are of a general
nature, like predicted changes in companies’ financial performance, as an effect of a
“dysfunctional transition period[s]” 192. Some may argue that the mentioned reasons for
efficiently used human capital in corporations had no value, because not the best but the most
appropriate candidates (gender-based), enter the boards.193 The tendency to appoint women is
less a case in self-regulatory regimes but just to accomplish an enforced legal quota system.194
Therefore we should spotlight on quota-specific disadvantages. Against mandatory quotas,
experience in Norway where still only 3% of CEOs are female, in spite of the quota for board
members there, thus arguing that the ‘trickle down’ effect of mandatory measures is virtually
non-existent.14195
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Does the Quota Pay Off?
Women, who are lacking experience as quota placements on corporate boards, are known
as the trophy director phenomenon196 or the golden skirt effect197. Forced by a quota companies
tend to reduce the board size to maximize the effect of the few female “trophies”. 198 At the same
time these trophy directors help the company to present a pluralistic image, refraining from
further efforts.199 This concerns critics that legal gender quotas have, on top of the already given
questionable profitability, also a general negative impact on gender equality.200
On the other hand, though an academic proof of a positive correlation should miss, the same
applies for the critic’s studies, because most of them are lacking longtime empirical negative
evidence.201 Surely, gender quotas are able to “alter business structures for integration of women
into leadership positions”202, while we have seen that voluntary soft measures often miss any
progress or do even stop them. 203 The just work in coexistence with mandatory quota
instruments, as we have seen in Norway and Finnalnd.204 The trap could be, that the industry
longs for positive correlations to be open for voluntary approaches205and as those are lacking any
evidence, they are vulnerable for circumventions.
Conclusion
All in all it is certain that the issue of gender diversity on corporate boards and its legal,
self-regulatory or mandatory implementation will remain highly controversial. In Chapter (II),
we examined the EU’s history on gender equality from the first attempt of Equal Payment in
1965 to today’s Draft Directive of the Commission. The gender diversity discussion in Germany
mirrors this long-term development best, portraying the power of obligatory laws and
recommendations of the EU and its Commission: from soft self-regulative measures to a
mandatory quota. Still, the German example is an average approach of diverse strategies among
Member States. Legal actions regarding gender diversity demand justifications, which we
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surveyed in Chapter (III). We found out that the economic reasoning is often used as incentive
for self-regulatory approaches while mandatory quota laws mostly find their justifications based
on fundamental rights arguments. Despite this pattern, the EU Commission falls out of this frame
by highlighting primarily economic considerations in its Directive. While examining the
functioning and variety of regulatory gender laws in the EU in Chapter (IV) it became evident,
that the multiplicity of national strategies were often limited by the countries’ perception of the
advantages of diversity. Chapter (V) hence presented the most contested issue of diversity: its
effectiveness. Pro-diversity studies and their critics helped understanding the debate, but their
arguments balanced each other in the end. More rewarding instead was the question of how to
measure effectiveness: countries’ particular evaluation ways are either based on equal
opportunities or the practical outcome of female board representation. The pitfall of legal gender
equality enforcement crystalized. As governments have to legitimate their legal actions, they
tried to offer companies a self-regulatory approach while pledging for positive economic effects
of diversity. Softer approaches failed due to the board’s unwillingness and their appointment of
trophy directors, challenging the equal opportunity attempt. The mandatory measures which
came therefore to force got justified by value arguments. Companies require evidence for
economic benefits out of gender diversity and even mandatory quotas cannot achieve this in a
short run, the legal strategies for diversity on corporate boards risks to become an only “nice
thought” but at the same time just a political straw fire. In the end, despite a lack efficiency
evidence, mandatory gender quotas can alter business structures in accordance with the EU’s
Equality Values and might seem the only chance to make any, even if little, change.
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Part III: Co-Authored by Tyler Winters and Madhuri Jacobs-Sharma
The United States’ Perspective: Why A Quota Wouldn’t Fly
A Constitutional Objection
In 1995, the Italian Constitutional Court206 held that a constitutional challenge against
two laws regulating gender diversity in elections was valid, because Article 3.2 of the Italian
Constitution sanctions substantive equality, but the Court determined that was not enough for the
adoption of affirmative actions measures in the political sphere. Although the EU has seen
mandatory quotas in a substantial subset of its member-states, the Constitution can be used as a
defense mechanism against this type of legislation.
In the United States, a constitutional challenge would certainly arise if a mandatory
gender quota for corporate boards were passed. The Equal Protections Clause of the Constitution
has been read to stand against the use of a mandatory quota to benefit a minority.207 The first
challenge that a quota in the realm of gender diversity would face is whether women are a
minority, and then if so, whether they deserve constitutional protection. In the Bakke case, the
court specifically noted that classifications that treat people as groups rather than individuals are
problematic on their face, and that a desire to increase minorities in the medical profession is not
a legitimate state interest.208 It is hard to see why there would be any way to justify a legitimate
state interest in increasing the number of women on corporate boards. Even if the quota would
pass the legitimate state interest test, it would again be difficult to see how one could say that a
mandatory quota would pass the next constitutional test, and be seen as “narrowly tailored” to
achieve that legitimate state interest. 209 As American constitutional law stands today, there is no
doubt that minority status can be considered in admissions and hiring decisions. Quotas, on the
other hand, are unconstitutional because you have the reverse discrimination argument on the
other side. For example, imagine that at a large company there was only one opening for a board
seat, and there were only two applicants for that seat. One applicant was a male and one was a
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female. The board is 1% below a hitting a mandatory quota set the by U.S. government for
female board members. The male applicant was the youngest person ever to serve on a Fortune
500 board and he is an expert in the industry of this company. The female has never served on a
board, and is actually more than four steps down the corporate ladder in terms of experience seen
as essential for becoming an effective board member. Does the United States really want to
implement a policy that could potentially deny a seat to the best candidate? Quotas go too far,
but gender should undeniably be considered as a factor in the conversation. A case from
Michigan Law School stands for the proposition that diversity can be considered in the process,
within the bounds of the Constitution.210 Strict scrutiny over whether the policy is narrowly
tailored to achieve the end of the legitimate state interest is required, but the court found that
affirmative action in admissions decisions was a constitutional exercise of the state’s interest in
improving diversity in higher education. A similar process would be equally likely to pass
constitutional muster in the realm of gender diversity in hiring practices. The question before us
today is not where exactly we draw that line, but certainly gender should be considered in hiring
practices, and, with all other qualities of candidacy being equal, giving the edge to the female
candidate may be the best policy for achieving diversity in that example. Unfortunately, that is
not the stage of the current issue that we face. Indisputably, mandatory quotas would not be
effective, nor constitutional, in the United States. However, in order to see the benefits from any
type of gender affirmative action program on corporate boards, we need to find a solution for
putting women in the position to be interviewed for those seats in the first place.
Ruth Rubio-Marin notes that this anti-classification reading of the Equal Protections
Clause (EPC) has gained strength over other readings of anti-subordination, as a mandatory
gender quota would violate the gender-neutral reading of the EPC.211 Rubio-Marin is one of the
few scholars who noted that the mandatory quotas are not necessarily unchallenged
constitutionally in Europe.212 Both Italy and France required constitutional amendments prior to
implementing mandatory quotas.213 Constitutional challenges are not a new concept in Europe
where mandatory quotas have been the answer for many countries’ gender diversity issues. In the
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United States, the Constitution would prevent a mandatory quota from taking effect, and based
on previous court decisions, has defeated mandatory quotas before they could even start.
Cultural Objections
Undoubtedly, any mandatory quota would face a strong constitutional objection, but a
mandatory quota should be seen as a last resort for the United States. Soft measures should come
first. Either using a voluntary pledge program similar to the Dutch’s Talent to the Top program,
or something drafted similarly to the Rooney Rule, would allow corporate board members and
decision makers to feel empowered. If the United States government passed legislation tomorrow
that required a mandatory gender quota for X% of board seats by some date in the distant future,
corporations would immediately feel threatened and either implement defensive or aggressive
strategies. The choice to respond either defensively and protect the current way of doing things,
or aggressively challenging the legislation, is not important. Either way, the new “quota” board
members become the targets and are the people that are forcing these boards to change their
equations for success. This creates multiple problems within the organizations and has a greater
opportunity to hurt large corporations in the short-term.
Conversely, if the United States could implement a voluntary pledge program—
admittedly tackling the question of “who” should start this initiative is another question in
itself—corporations that sign on to the pledge could feel like they are part of the conversation. It
would give major public companies the ability to sign on to a pledge that makes them look good
in the eyes of the public and their consumers. Filling board seats with women would be seen as a
positive and active decision made from within, and just maybe, these new board members could
influence the company with real power, and still allow the board to drive increased shareholder
value through the public good will that stems from increased gender diversity at the executive
level.
In a mandatory quota regime, companies are forced to hire people that they do not
necessarily plan to ever hire, which obviously could create animosity among the board. In that
situation, in order to come into compliance with the regulation, what happens to current board
members that have been effective during their time on the board? Are companies supposed to ask
seasoned members to step down to be replaced because of legislation—which would cause
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further constitutional complications,214 or should companies simply add board seats and dilute
the power of the individual members, and potentially decrease shareholder value because of it?
To provide another example, imagine a corporation—albeit a small one—that only has 10 board
seats. If a 40% mandatory gender quota were implemented, the company has two potentially
very bad outcomes. First, it could hire seven female board members (7/17 is 41.1%), adding
seven new seats to the board, and significantly decreasing the power of all of the current board
members. Alternatively, the board could remove four of the current directors, who may
presumably be doing a good job, and replace those board members with four new females. A
voluntary pledge program would allow companies to avoid both of these issues.
Companies should be hiring more women. Companies should be promoting more
women. More women should be effective and powerful members of the boards of the Fortune
500 in the United States. That being said, companies should be given the opportunity to make
this decision on their own, with just a small nudge in the right direction. Let the companies
derive shareholder and consumer goodwill from changing their hiring practices to conform to
industry standards. If Ford signed onto a mandatory pledge and receives public praise, is there
anyone that believes that General Motors would not sign onto that very same pledge? If a
company like Google signed on, the ripple effect it would have in the tech space would be
unfathomable.
Mandatory quotas in the United States will not lead to truly increased diversity on
corporate boards. It is already an issue in the United States that a few women sit on many
different boards as “trophy directors.”215 They are simply there to fill the role of increasing
diversity for that company, but do not have any effective power for decision-making. To
implement a mandatory quota runs a severe risk that any new female board members will be seen
as “quota fillers” or met with outright resentment from the other board members.
A European View of US Law on Gender Equality
While the discussions on gender diversity in the EU are often mirrored by debates on
established or newly introduced corporate governance codes, the overall picture across the
Atlantic is actually different. On its roots, the gender gap in U.S. business boards remains with
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15.7 % of female board membership (compared to 16.6 % in the EU) one of the widest in the
Anglo-Saxon countries.216
Moreover in the US the percentage of female representation in leadership positions
changed from an already flattening figure to a mere stagnation since 2004, which is often
explained by the financial crisis and its aftermaths.217 In general the discussion’s approach is also
extremely different, as: “support for diversity [in the U.S.] has grown in principle, but progress
has lagged in practice, and controversy has centered on whether and why diversity matters”.218
Therefore, it should be highlighted where the differences between the U.S. and the EU are
rooting out, how the concrete state measures for gender equality are justified and applied in the
country and in front of cultural-specific backgrounds.
Quota: Why It Might Not Fly in the US That Easily?
The primary differences between the EU and the U.S. concerning gender equality
measures can be found in different fields, namely: specific U.S. law, an exceptional business
culture and social structure of the country. All these differences come into account while
discussing hard and invasive equality-laws, which are eminently embodied by a mandatory
quota.
Some argue that quotas for female directors would be necessary in the U.S. to overcome
structural impediments and to help women directors reach or exceed a critical mass.219
The Specific U.S. Law
In the U.S. the functioning and mere concept of a gender quota, seems as a: “cultural and
legal oddity in the United States; a European transplant unlikely to take root [t]here”220. The
main reason therefore is the fact that any quota system on the basis of sex violates the U.S.
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.221 At the national level, the handling of business
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regulations in the U.S. is very exceptional and mirrors the neo-liberal attitude and basis of U.S.
business law222 as well as the overall political attitude to keep entrepreneur‘s backs “as free as is
consistent with public order.”223 This basis is also incorporated in state law, which sets limited
boundaries for corporations, “in the service of economic efficiency.”224 The general attitude
denies any competence of the central state in this field.225 Because of this liberal attitude, state
corporate law in the U.S. is generally seen as an inappropriate way to introduce mandatory
quotas, as it also affects the inner competition between the U.S. States.226
Business Culture Reasons
Even if a mandatory gender-quota could withstand the constitutional differences of U.S.
law, the regulation itself would generally stand against the nation's laissez faire business
ideology.227 While the EU has a strong welfare state tradition since the end of World War II,
enabling state interventions in the economy and employment regulations, the U.S. traditions do
not offer these possibilities.228 On the contrary the U.S. economy is strictly against any industrial
policy or planning by a central state, while the isolated worker-units just offer a limited base for
grass root-claims for gender-equality.229 On a higher level, the discussions on gender equality in
the U.S. mainly focus on the why and not on the how of women’s participation in corporate
boards should be enhanced.230 At the same time the discussions in the EU predominantly circle
around the question of appropriateness of mechanisms to achieve this goal.231
But while the economic evidence in the U.S. discussion is predominant, some anticipate
that even a clear positive correlation of higher company earnings through expanded women’s
participation in boards would be proven, quotas would not be the tool of choice.232 At first
because the self-regulatory of companies’ conception is that “firms that would benefit from
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greater female representation on boards would already have done so.”233 Secondly, the U.S.
concerns regarding invasive quota laws are also shared by individual employees234, which fear to
lose their credibility and stigmatization due to quota rules in the extremely competitive U.S.
economy.235 This might be a reason, why also “a majority of American female directors are
oppose quotas, even though they believe the strategy would be effective in increasing board
diversity”.236
Obligating U.S. corporations to give information about recruitment and promotion would
facilitate comparing their performance to similar institutes, and for stakeholders to hold poor
performers accountable. The government could demand transparency of board recruitment
forcing corporations to disclose if female candidates were considered or interviewed. An even
stronger approach would be to encourage corporations to adopt a version of the "Rooney Rule,"
applicable to professional football. The National Football League (NFL) requires teams to pledge
to include a minority candidate among the finalists for each coaching and general manager
position and to conduct an on-site interview with that finalist.230 In the seven years after "the
rule was adopted in 2003, the number of black head coaches in the NFL increased from 6% to
22%. Securities and Exchange Commissioner Luis Aguilar has suggested that "many corporate
boards may need their own Rooney [R]ule ....
Social Differences
The specific historical background of the U.S. has its direct impact on local economic
politics that leads directly to “impossibility”.237 Until today around 75% of corporate board seats
are given to white men238 while in 66% of the Fortune 500 companies no women of color holds a
board seat at all.239 Although the overall number of women and minorities on U.S. corporate
boards grew in three decades from merely representation in 7% of corporate boards to 76% in
2014240, the overall representation on boards remains rather low.241 But not alone women of
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color have to struggle with social norms and strains, which keep them out of the top companies
employments. Christian-fundamentalist communities, which are highly influential in some
American states, are demanding a picture of women which is mainly or exclusively focused on
the family care-work and not on carrier or individual fulfillment. 242
This peer pressure on women in general could be the reason why in the U.S. quota laws
are also highly contentious among those who are otherwise highly interested in women’s
equality, especially by feminists.243 While this phenomenon is also known in Europe, the U.S.
focus on labor-essentialism reinforces this quota obstacle.244 The double-tracked quota
discussions in Europe, based on positive economic assumptions and fundamental values, seem to
be unique in this case.245
Conclusion: A Wrap-Up from the U.S. Perspective
The United States is already facing great pressure to change, as the percentage of females
on corporate boards has stalled over the last few years in the United States.246 If the government
is set on implementing legislation to follow the trend in the EU, it needs to start with legislation
that is modeled on the Rooney Rule. Force companies to put women at least in the position to get
the job. The NFL did it, and teams have been surprised by the quality of the minority candidates
they interviewed—so surprised that 14% more of the minorities were hired into head coaching
positions than before the NFL implemented the rule.247 If corporate boards are given the same set
of ground rules for their hiring practices, they too will be surprised by the quality of the
candidates they receive. The SEC’s rules on disclosure were not strict enough and did not require
companies to take any action. The rules are not specific to gender or racial diversity, and were
admittedly “not intended to steer behavior.”248 Over 60 companies continue to fail to comply
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with the SEC disclosure rules.249 Corporations need something that is stricter, more explicit, and
actually works. Programs like the Rooney Rule will create change.
The only programs that can be effective in the United States are strong top-down policies
that are implemented by the corporations themselves. The corporations must be open and willing
to hire women, and create the right work environment at the board level to create effective
change. Peter Grauer, leader of the U.S. chapter of the 30% club, which aims for higher female
representation globally on FTSE-100 boards, notes that “a mandatory quota isn’t the way to
make [change] happen.”250 Barb Stinnett, one of the first female executives in the tech space in
her role as director of worldwide sales for Hewlett-Packard, agrees with Grauer.251 Both Stinnett
and Grauer agree that there is a fear of “token hires” with respect to the implementation of a
mandatory quota in the U.S.252 No female board member wants to be seen as a token director,
and no female board member wants her qualifications diminished because of the use of a
mandatory quota.
The U.S. has women out there that are ready to take on these roles in companies and
ready for the added responsibility. They want these jobs, they have worked hard for these jobs,
and they are prepared to succeed as board members. Fortune 500 companies just need a
voluntary program or small piece of legislation to give them the nudge to start opening their
doors to these women, in order to break down long held stereotypes.253 Bottom-up legislation
requiring a set quota will not be effective—it will serve to setback any future female board
members, who will be seen as “token hires” or “quota fillers.” The United States’ only option for
affecting change is to take the admittedly slower, but more thorough route of top-down programs
that force organizations to change from the top and from within, in order to create a work
environment that will allow female executives to thrive and add value. The women are out there.
The women are qualified and prepared. They can add value, but corporate America needs a
push—or shove—in the right direction, so that it can take the first steps toward change on its
own.
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